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Abstract
I n response to the fi nancial crisis, the Eurozone pursued a number of initia-tives to create a safer fi nancial sector for the single market. However, the 
divergent preferences between core and periphery countries and the negative 
legacy of the crisis have watered down ambitious reform plans for substantial 
risk-sharing arrangements. In this context, the Eurozone cannot strike a balance 
between solidarity and crisis prevention. Compared to mid-2012, the “window of 
opportunity” for strengthening the banking union seems closed for the moment. 
Paradoxically, doing reforms in fair weather is much more diffi cult, while the 
immediate reason for the sudden move to Banking Union was the intensifying 
euro sovereign crisis. As a consequence, the implemented reforms have limited 
scope and they leave room to fi nancial markets for a disciplining role over states. 
KEY-WORDS: Eurozone, banking union, reforms, risk-sharing, market disci-
pline.
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Περίληψη
Τ ην επαύριον της παγκόσμιας χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης, η Ευρωζώνη έλαβε σημαντικές πρωτοβουλίες για τη διαμόρφωση ενός ασφαλέστερου χρηματο-
πιστωτικού συστήματος και την εμπέδωση μιας πραγματικά ενιαίας χρηματοπι-
στωτικής αγοράς. Παρά ταύτα, οι αποκλίνουσες προτιμήσεις μεταξύ των χωρών 
του πυρήνα και αυτών της περιφέρειας, όπως επίσης και η αρνητική κληρονομιά 
της κρίσης (π.χ. μη εξυπηρετούμενα δάνεια), έχουν αποδυναμώσει τα πιο φιλόδο-
ξα μεταρρυθμιστικά σχέδια, σχετικά με τον αποτελεσματικότερο επιμερισμό των 
κινδύνων μεταξύ των κρατών-μελών. Επιπρόσθετα, η πολιτική σταθερότητα και 
η σταδιακή οικονομική ανάκαμψη των τελευταίων ετών έχουν -παραδόξως- περι-
ορίσει σημαντικά το «παράθυρο ευκαιρίας» για την ολοκλήρωση της τραπεζικής 
ένωσης, σε σχέση με το αντίστοιχο «παράθυρο» για την υλοποίηση σημαντικών 
μεταρρυθμίσεων που δημιουργήθηκε το 2012. Το γεγονός, λοιπόν, ότι τα μέτρα 
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που έχουν -έως σήμερα- παρθεί από την πολιτική ηγεσία της Ευρωζώνης είναι 
περιορισμένου βεληνεκούς, ενισχύει τον ρόλο της «πειθαρχίας της αγοράς» στον 
τομέα της προληπτικής τραπεζικής εποπτείας, με ό,τι αυτό συνεπάγεται για την 
πολιτική αυτονομία των κρατών-μελών και της ζώνης του ευρώ συνολικά. 
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Ευρωζώνη, τραπεζική ένωση, μεταρρυθμίσεις, επιμερισμός 
των κινδύνων, «πειθαρχία της αγοράς».
1. Introduction
T he sovereign debt and banking crises of 2010-12 have led to signifi cant changes in the institutions of the Eurozone. More specifi cally, the decision 
of heads of state or government of euro area countries on 28-29 June 2012 to es-
tablish the banking union was the hallmark of an important reform process. The 
three pillars of the banking union -the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Sin-
gle Resolution Mechanism and the European Deposit Insurance Scheme- ensure 
stronger prudential requirements for banks and common rules for managing 
troubled fi nancial institutions. However, a common system for deposit protec-
tion has yet to be established and further measures are needed to tackle the re-
maining risks of the banking sector. During the past few years, many ambitious 
reforms have been watered down due to the political disagreement on the extent 
of solidarity required for a deeper banking and economic integration. A truly 
Eurozone budget does not currently exist; banking integration and the common 
deposit insurance scheme are proceeding at glacial speed; a decision on a com-
mon “safe asset” is in deep freeze (Pagoulatos 2020). What are the reasons which 
reduced the “window of opportunity” for implementing more ambitious initia-
tives after 2012? What is the content of the current debate on strengthening the 
banking union? How will the banking union be affected from the recent reforms 
of the Eurozone? Has the sovereign-bank doom loop been suffi ciently severed? 
Is it possible to reconcile risk sharing with market discipline? We explore these 
questions looking at: (a) the role of a complete banking union and the surround-
ing political confl icts, (b) the possibility of opening a new “window of opportuni-
ty”, as it was the case in 2012, and (c) the content of the current reform proposals 
and the following political initiatives which have taken place. 
2. The role of a complete banking union in the euro area
I n the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, a strong heterogeneity in mac-roeconomic variables remains in the EMU. For example, there is signifi cant 
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heterogeneity in unemployment rates across the euro area countries. In this 
regard, the low degree of risk sharing through banking systems, capital markets, 
savings, and, to a lesser extent, fi scal policy within the EMU made things worse 
and delayed recovery (Gopinath 2019: 244). On the contrary, in the US, it is 
estimated that around 70% of local crises are absorbed through the integrated 
fi nancial markets with the capital markets absorbing about 45% and the 
remaining 25% absorbed by the banking market. In the euro zone, however, the 
overall absorption rate is only 25% (Draghi 2018). Indeed, risk-concentration is 
signifi cantly high in the economies of the Eurozone. European banks have been 
criticized for holding too much domestic government debt, before and during the 
crisis, intensifying the doom loop between sovereign and bank credit risks. Banks 
and sovereigns are linked by three interacting channels: (a) banks hold large 
amounts of sovereign debt; (b) banks are protected by government guarantees; (c) 
and the health of banks and governments both affects and is affected by economic 
activity (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018: 6). There are “bad” and “good” reasons for that. 
The “bad” reason for increasing sovereign home bias is the excessive exposure 
to high-yielding risky sovereigns (Acharya and Steffen 2013), in combination 
with the long history of banking nationalism in Europe (Veron 2017). Basel 
bank regulations also treated sovereign debt essentially as risk-free, implicitly 
assuming that there would always be a bailout. On the other hand, the bank-
sovereign nexus may be considered as a stabilizing force for home economies 
during market downturns when sovereign risk rises. Informational advantage 
might lead domestic banks to act as buyers of last resort, absorbing the local 
assets while foreign banks may rid themselves of their exposures (Saka 2016).
In this context, the role of a fully operational banking union in the euro 
area is two-fold: (a) to manage the fl ow of credit risk emanating from weak 
banks to the balance sheet of their sovereigns and (b) to manage the fl ow of 
credit risk emanating from sovereigns to the banking system holding sovereign 
debt (Acharya 2012, Goodhart and Schoenmaker 2009). In the same vein, an 
integrated architecture for fi nancial stability would reduce fi nancial fragmen-
tation and weaken the vicious loop in many countries of rising sovereign and 
bank borrowing costs. Moreover, a single regulatory and supervisory framework 
would contain systemic risks and limit the moral hazard related to common 
safety nets; a single resolution mechanism with adequate fi nancial backstop 
would isolate and minimize areas of weakness; and a common safety net would 
help prevent massive deposit runs (Goyal et al. 2013: 6,7). In addition, another 
group of safe asset proposals consider that a European-level safe asset could 
emerge as part of a borrowing capacity for a European budget or for European 
institutions (Best 2018: 11).
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In the light of the above, the current debate on banking union is over wheth-
er to put risk sharing or risk reduction fi rst. Solidarity means, by defi nition, 
a kind of risk sharing and debt mutualization but, on the other hand, moral 
hazard always exists in such a process. Nordic countries are in favour of the 
banking union ultimately being completed although they believe that the fi rst 
priority should be risk reduction (Smid et al. 2018). For example, the idea of a 
full common safe asset to manage the fl ow of credit risk emanating from sover-
eigns to the banking system holding sovereign debt was rejected by the fi scal 
conservatives (Issing 2009). A common European safe asset tends to improve 
Euro area fi nancial stability by limiting destabilizing capital fl ows as well as 
break the bank-sovereign nexus by limiting domestic bias in bank portfolios. For 
this reason, several proposals have been put forward, ranging from full to partial 
or common issuance, some based on mutualisation and others entailing no joint 
liabilities (Monti 2010, European Commission 2011, van Riet 2017, Leandro and 
Zettelmeyer 2018). Nevertheless, breaking the doom loop requires the adoption 
of a common safe asset, since “all regulatory designs are constrained by the in-
completeness of euro area sovereign debt markets, which make it impossible 
to assemble a portfolio that has suffi ciently low concentration and credit risk” 
(Alogoskoufi s and Langfi eld 2019).
Consequently, beyond the technical aspect of risk-sharing, there are two dif-
ferent strategies that are unfolding on the future of the banking and economic 
union in general: on the one hand, there are those proposals that seek to create 
a large and robust bond market in the Eurozone in order to deepen the single fi -
nancial market and, on the other hand, proposals with far more political content 
that tend towards fi scal union by promoting the creation of a mechanism to help 
troubled economies to maintain a stable source of funding, even in times of crisis 
(Claeys 2018). The divergent interests of core and periphery economies are ex-
plained by the different variables that affect fl uctuations of growth rates. More 
specifi cally, institutional integration plays a positive role for growth, overall 
and for the periphery in particular. Looking into the variables which are linked 
to differences in growth rates the fi ndings affi rm a positive association of the 
EU institutional and political integration with long-run growth, for periphery 
countries particularly (Comunale and Mongelli 2019a). In the opposite direction, 
deeper fi nancial integration seems to have benefi cial effects on the core econo-
mies, but it is not signifi cant in the periphery (Comunale and Mongelli 2019b). 
perifereia t.9o.indd   116 15/6/2020   1:18:04 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:20 |
REGION & PERIPHERY [117]
3. The lost opportunity for deepening the banking union
A) The “window of opportunity” in 2012
I n the recent literature on explaining the response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area there is a trend detected towards a new type of intergovern-
mentalism that includes to some degree a neofunctionalist perspective (Bicker-
ton et al. 2015, Schimmelfennig 2015, Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016, Epstein 
and Rhodes 2016, Schimmelfennig 2017). On the one hand, liberal intergovern-
mentalism explains the politics to cope with the euro area crisis by the infl uence 
of national preferences and bargaining power. On the other, the core assumption 
of the neofunctionalist approach connects the degree of integration progress with 
the realization of mutual gains from cooperation in policy arenas characterized 
by high levels of functional interdependence. In this context, divergent national 
preferences on distributional consequences of fi scal consolidation were accompa-
nied by a common willingness of member states to preserve the euro. This led, in 
turn, to incomplete solutions based on minimal supranationalism, which deep-
ened integration in an asymmetric way. Asymmetric effects took place to prevent 
complete collapse, but the core development is that fi nancially powerful mem-
ber states imposed limited risk-sharing on weaker economies (Jones et al. 2016, 
Donnelly 2014). If that is the case, competing coalitions of member states that 
shared any similar economic interests by saving the common currency resulted 
in an incomplete banking union (Howarth and Quaglia 2016, Quaglia 2017): 
banking supervision was supranationalised; resolution was supranationalised 
although there is still room for intergovernmental bargaining and a relatively 
high degree of discretion exercised by national resolution authorities; and a sin-
gle deposit guarantee scheme was not established.
Nevertheless, recent literature has not yet scrutinized the timing of the set-
ting up of the European Banking Union. The banking union as a term was fi rst 
introduced in the European public debate at the end of 2011 and was widely used 
by European offi cials in the spring of 2012 (Veron 2015). Until then, the EU fol-
lowed the recommendations of the Jacques de Larosière report, which rejected 
the introduction of a single surveillance mechanism as unrealistic and recom-
mended the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) to organize a 
more formal coordination of national supervisory authorities. So, what explains 
this policy change? Our analysis for examining the “window of opportunity”1 in 
mid-2012 is based on the “multiple streams” theory of policy formation. This 
theory is concerned with three categories of independent variables that interact 
to create “windows of opportunity”: (a) the “problem stream” is fi lled with percep-
tions of problems that are seen as “public”; (b) the “policy stream” is fi lled with 
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the output of experts and analysts who examine problems and propose solu-
tions; and (c) the “political stream” comprises factors such as changes in national 
mood, executive or legislative turnover (Béland and Howlett 2016). The “window 
of opportunity” in mid-2012 turned up as a result of the coupling of two main 
streams: the political stream and the problem stream. These developments, in 
turn, brought about a signifi cant policy change. First, Spain’s request for fi nan-
cial assistance altered the “framing contest” of the Eurozone crisis, accelerating 
the creation of the banking union. Framing contests refer broadly to “the way in 
which political elites, such as the news media, politicians, interest groups, and 
other political players, defi ne the political space and erect the boundaries within 
which a public policy issue will be considered” (Callaghan and Schnell 2005: xi). 
In this regard, it is important to underline that “if Spain had agreed to an adjust-
ment program before the spring of 2012, the window of opportunity for the bank-
ing union would not open because the bank recapitalizations would have been 
negotiated bilaterally with the Troika” (De Rynk 2014). Consequently, European 
leaders, and Angela Merkel in particular, recognized the increased systemic risk 
and the contagion risk against the backdrop of the problematic Eurozone archi-
tecture. Since then, the need for accelerating the creation of a permanent crisis 
resolution mechanism and the establishment of the banking union were consid-
ered top priorities (ESM 2019b:132). The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
a permanent solution for the lack of a backstop for euro area countries which 
no longer maintain access to external fi nance, was established in October 2012. 
The ESM is the successor to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), 
which was set up as a temporary solution in June 2010 and provided fi nancial 
assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
Furthermore, the change in the conceptual framework of the crisis encoun-
tered the political developments (“political stream”) that took place in some 
politically important countries, i.e. Italy, Spain and France, during November 
2011-May 2012. The fi rst political change took place in Italy, in November 2011. 
The technocratic government of Mario Monti replaced the government of Silvio 
Berlusconi, who resigned on 12 November 2011, under the pressure of fi nan-
cial markets. Mario Monti, on the other hand, was welcomed with great satis-
faction by the fi nancial markets. At the same time, the Spanish government’s 
bond yields approached the levels of Portugal and Greece in their time of need, 
and socialist Prime Minister Zapatero called early elections in December 2011. 
The conservative leader Mariano Rajoy emerged as a winner with a very rigor-
ous fi nancial agenda supporting an adjustment programme of €65 billion in the 
next two years, the largest ever in the Spanish history. Subsequently, in May 
2012, François Hollande won the presidency of France, promising a “new start” 
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and an end to the austerity measures imposed by Germany. Despite their ideo-
logical differences, all the new leaders signaled a new era of political stability 
in Southern Europe. Moreover, the political changes marked the creation of a 
robust coalition against Germany’s restrictive fi scal policies. For example, the 
change of government in Spain in November 2011 brought “a signifi cant change 
in crisis management: the style became more adversarial, less predictable”. In 
February 2012, the prime minister Rajoy announced that “Spain would not meet 
its fi scal targets and hinted he was not prepared to agree on binding new restric-
tions” (Brunnermeier et al. 2016: 353). The effects of the above political changes 
were shown at the European Council of 28-29 June 2012, which confi rmed the 
decision to support the European Banking Union. At this Council, the President 
of the European Council was invited to develop, in close collaboration with the 
President of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and the President 
of the ECB, a specifi c and time-bound road map for the achievement of a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union. The report “Towards a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union” including “four essential building blocks” for the future EMU: 
an integrated fi nancial framework, an integrated budgetary framework, an in-
tegrated economic policy framework and strengthened democratic legitimacy 
and accountability (European Council 2012). It was upon these “building blocks” 
that European leaders decided to take on signifi cant political initiatives for the 
strengthening of banking and economic integration.
The European Commission proposed a regulation for the establishment of 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in September 2012. The initiative to 
create the fi rst pillar of the banking union was formalized on 15 October 2013, 
when the Council of the European Union approved Regulation (EU) 1024/2013. 
The SSM came into force on 4 November 2014, thereby the ECB assumed the 
supervisory tasks assigned in accordance with the SSM Regulation. Thereafter, 
the SSM supervises directly the systemically important banks of the participat-
ing countries.2 In addition, the ECB may at any time demand and take over the 
direct supervision of smaller banks. Furthermore, all euro area member states 
participate automatically in the SSM and other EU countries that do not yet 
have the euro as their currency can choose to participate in “close cooperation” 
with the ECB. It is worth noting that the establishment of the SRM took place 
despite the strong resistance from key local interests, mainly the dissatisfac-
tion of small/medium public saving banks (Sparkassen and Ländesbanken) and 
cooperative banks, which are the central pillar of liquidity for the regional de-
velopment in Germany. Given the vital role of saving banks in the economy, 
the German government favored a limited scope of single supervision, focusing 
exclusively on systemically important banks, in order to maintain saving banks 
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under domestic control (EUobserver 2013). In this direction, the German sav-
ing banks association supported that “banks that are too big to fail -not savings 
banks- should remain the regulatory priority”. Additionally, the German saving 
banks underlined that the new supervisory mechanism should “take into ac-
count the different circumstances” (Financial Times 2012) and the specifi c char-
acteristics of each individual economy. 
Regarding the second pillar of the banking union, resolution is the orderly 
restructuring of a bank when the bank is failing or likely to fail. This procedure 
ensures that a bank failure does not harm the broader economy or cause fi nancial 
instability. In July 2013, the Commission issued a proposal for the establishment 
of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The fi nal agreement was accom-
plished at a meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council in December 
2013. The SRM applies to all the banks being subject to the SSM. The organiza-
tion of the SRM mirrors that of the SSM, as far as the division of responsibilities 
between the supranational authority and the national authorities is concerned 
(Baglioni 2016: 95). The tasks of resolution are assigned to the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB), in collaboration with national authorities, which retain responsi-
bility for executing the resolution actions. The SRB consists of representatives 
from the ECB, the Commission and the national resolution authorities; also, it 
covers all the banks headquartered in Banking Union member states. Addition-
ally, the SRB holds broad powers in cases of bank resolution upon notifi cation by 
the European Central Bank, which decides when a bank is failing or likely to fail. 
Otherwise, the Board on its own initiative would adopt a resolution scheme plac-
ing the bank into resolution. The Board would also determine the application of 
resolution tools and the use of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Decisions by the 
Board would come into force within 24 hours of their adoption, unless the Council, 
acting by simple majority on a proposal by the Commission, objected or called for 
changes (Council of the European Union 2013). It is worth noting that the Ger-
man government with their allies (Holland, Finland) opposed the Commission’s 
decision-making power on the approval of a resolution plan and they pushed to 
assign this responsibility to the Council (El Mundo 2013a).
The banking union also allows the SRF to support fi nancially the restruc-
turing process. The SRF is composed of contributions from credit institutions 
through the pooling of fi nancial resources of national funds of participating coun-
tries. Furthermore, it is important to underline the ability of the SRF to bor-
row from the markets. In 2012, the then Internal Market Commissioner Michel 
Barnier proposed alternatively that the ESM should assume the permanent 
rescue backstop facility task. On the other hand, the German government op-
posed strongly these proposals. Wolfgang Schäuble, the then German Finance 
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Minister, challenged the legal basis of Barnier’s proposal (El Mundo 2013b) and 
insisted that a resolution process “could only be the responsibility of the national 
resolution authorities” (DW 2013). Five years later, a wider package of measures 
to complete the Banking Union, which was approved in December 2018, included 
the introduction of the common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). 
The common backstop will be in place by 1 January 2024 at the latest. The size 
of the credit lines will be aligned with the target level of the SRF, which is 1% 
of covered deposits in the Banking Union (currently estimated at around €55 
billion) (SRF 2019: 1). If the credit line is used, the SRF will pay back the ESM 
loan with money from bank contributions within three years, although this pe-
riod can be extended by up to another two years. As a result, it will be fi scally 
neutral over the medium term (ESM 2019a). Additionally, a contribution from 
the SRF to recapitalisation may be made only under two key requirements in-
cluded in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD): the bail-in of at 
least 8% of total liabilities including own funds (TLOF), and a contribution of a 
maximum of 5% of TLOF. Furthermore, the use of the SRF would be assessed by 
the Commission to ensure it complies with State aid rules. Nevertheless, some 
national authorities have resisted in several cases a complete implementation 
of the BRRD. For example, the Italian authorities lobbied the Commission for 
leeway and looked into the intricacies of the BRRD to fi nd the extent of discre-
tion allowed for policy makers, just as was the case with the treatment of three 
failing Italian banks -Monte de Paschi, Veneto and Vicenza- that were resolved 
in 2016/2017 (Donnelly and Asimakopoulos 2019).
As regards the third pillar of the European Banking Union, the insurance 
deposit scheme remains merely a system of national deposit guarantee schemes. 
More specifi cally, the Directive 2014/49/EU provides that all deposits up to 
€100.000 are protected all over the EU. Despite the pressure from the European 
Commission for a single insurance deposit scheme, the German government “has 
long opposed it, fearing a political backlash to the idea that its funds could be 
used to guarantee the deposits of savers in other European countries” (Reuters 
2015). In addition, the fear of moral hazard has resulted in the rejection, by the 
German authorities, of any form of debt mutualization, like a single European 
liability – proposed by the Commission in October 2017 (European Commission 
2017). From the point of view of the Germans, “entrepreneurial and political 
responsibility and liability must not be separated”, while a single European li-
ability “leads to the opposite outcome” (Handelsblatt 2018). 
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B) This time is -actually- different…
In the mid of 2015, the so called “Five Presidents’ report”, authored by Jean-
Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi, and Martin 
Schulz, was published outlining plans for strengthening the economic and mon-
etary union by 2025 at the latest. Since then, a lot has been done towards com-
pleting the EMU. However, the banking union’s architecture is not yet complete. 
Compared to mid-2012, there are strong differences resulting in minimizing the 
“window of opportunity” for signifi cant reforms. First, as regards the problem 
stream, the economic situation over the last three years is clearly more stable, 
less pressing and the spreads of the periphery countries remain under control. 
The European Commission in an update ahead of the Euro Summit of December 
2018 underlined that the global fi nancial crisis that hit Europe “laid bare some 
of its institutional weaknesses. Thanks to determined efforts, Europe is now 
experiencing a robust economic recovery with growth in all Member States. This 
provides a window of opportunity to take the next steps towards deepening Eu-
rope’s Economic and Monetary Union. It is essential for its members as well as 
for the EU as a whole” (European Commission 2018: 2). But doing reforms in fair 
weather paradoxically is much more diffi cult, while the immediate reason for the 
sudden move to Banking Union was the intensifying euro sovereign crisis (Sch-
oenmaker 2016). At the political level, apart from President Macron, the leaders 
of two other politically important countries, namely of Italy and Spain, have just 
taken offi ce and their prospects are not yet clear. In Italy, the new coalition gov-
ernment is based on two parties (the Democratic Party and the Five Stars Move-
ment), and it is doubtful whether they have the power to handle the tedious and 
demanding negotiations at a European level. In Spain, the coalition government 
includes the anti- systemic Podemos, under the socialist Prime Minister Pedro 
Sánchez, and it is doubtful whether it can overcome internal divisions among the 
heterogeneous members that make up the parliamentary majority. In addition, 
Chancellor Merkel’s self-declared last term in offi ce reduces the possibility for 
important steps towards reforming the Eurozone at a bare minimum.
 The political reluctance to complete the banking union manifested, for ex-
ample, at the end of March 2018, even though the Eurozone’s heads decided 
that “in the next six months, the work of fi nance ministers should focus on areas 
where the convergence of views is greatest. Gradual progress on issues such as 
the completion of the Banking Union […] should signifi cantly strengthen the 
resilience of EMU” (Euro Summit 2018). More specifi cally, the French President 
supported the creation of a pan-European bank deposit guarantee fund, as well 
as the completion of the Single Resolution Fund, funded by the ESM. A few 
weeks before the Summit, Emmanuel Macron believed that together with the 
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German Chancellor Angela Merkel they would present a common line for the 
planned Eurozone reform ahead of the Summit of March but that was not con-
fi rmed. As a result, President Macron appeared at the Summit along with Mari-
ano Rajoy and Antonio Costa. This alliance emphasized the formation of a pole 
against the reluctance of Berlin and its allies, which did not support any form 
of mutualization (Euractiv 2018). In this direction, the Danish, Estonian, Finn-
ish, Irish and Latvian Ministers for Finance in a joint communiqué in March 
2018 referred to their objections to the reform plans, and they put the issue of 
budgetary discipline on top of the agenda (Reuters 2018). One and a half years 
later, a common deposit insurance scheme is still proceeding at glacial speed. 
However, German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz offered a ray of hope in Novem-
ber 2019. The SPD politician said that the European Union needs to increase its 
pace regarding the banking union and signaled a willingness to compromise on 
the EU-wide bank deposit reinsurance, in an op-ed for the Financial Times. In 
this context, he proposed a “European Reinsurance System” for bank deposits to 
complete the banking union (DW 2019).
Lastly, the most crucial development, which postpones more ambitious re-
forms, is related to the new European Commission’ priorities, under President 
Ursula von der Leyen. Instead of the previous Commission’ strategy under Jean-
Claude Juncker, whose strategy implied a more “political” management of the 
European Union’s economic crisis, der Leyen identifi es the adaption of Europe 
to geopolitical developments as top priority. Europe has to deal with the conse-
quences of US President Donald Trump’s unilateral initiatives; Turkey’s inva-
sion in Syria; Libyan crisis; and the new state of the agreement on the Iranian 
nuclear program after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani by an American 
drone (Pagoulatos 2020).
4. The hesitant reform steps and the still incomplete 
banking union
I n 2018, the joint proposals of fourteen economists in France and Germany on the reform of the Eurozone opened de novo a pan-European debate on its 
future architecture (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2018). These proposals seek to strike a 
balance between risk-sharing and crisis prevention by fi nding a middle-ground 
between solidarity and responsibility in order to break the “bank-sovereign nex-
us”: the fact that European banks hold a large bulk of government bonds of 
their home country (“home bias”). The open debate already includes the French 
President’ package of reforms (DW 2018) as well as the Spanish proposals (Al-
munia et al. 2018), which entail more banking and fi scal integration. In this 
perifereia t.9o.indd   123 15/6/2020   1:18:04 μμ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 04:02:20 |
[124] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
direction, we have to include the Commission Communication of October 2017 
“on completing the banking union” (European Commission 2017). On the other 
hand, there is strong opposition on such a prospect from creditor countries, due 
to moral hazard and the legacy of “bad” debt of the periphery banks (Euractiv 
2018). After the launch of these proposals, a series of political initiatives has 
taken place. As it will be shown these initiatives are closer to the joint propos-
als of the Franco-German economists than those that imply deeper banking and 
institutional integration. 
First, the Heads of State or Government in December 2018 approved a pack-
age of measures to complete the Banking Union and to strengthen further the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). Nevertheless, a common system for deposit insurance and a common safe 
asset as well have not yet been decided and further measures are needed to tackle 
the non-performing exposures of the banking sector via a European “bad” bank. 
In 2019, there were the Euro Summit of June, a Eurogroup meeting on De-
cember 4, and the Euro Summit of December. Eurozone leaders agreed on further 
technical work on previous decisions (i.e, the Euro Summit of December 2018) 
for strengthening the banking union in particular. This is important because 
the timing of the intervention really matters, with speedier resolutions often en-
tailing lower ex-post fi scal burden (Claessens et al. 2012). Little has been done, 
however, to weaken bank-sovereign nexus; for example, through a pool of assets 
diversifi ed across countries. For the euro area, where fi scal stabilization policies 
are national in nature, the creation of sovereign-bond-backed securities would 
have the potential of increasing private risk sharing across borders. This would 
automatically spread default risk across borders, curtailing banks’ exposure to 
sovereign risk, and limit the sovereign-bank nexus (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018: 38). 
Nevertheless, creating safe European assets, such as euro bonds, would involve 
a number of joint liabilities of all member states within a common fi scal policy 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2011). Such political initiatives (that is, a common fi scal 
policy) have not been taken. The ESM reform, for example, provides a limited 
and strictly conditional fi nancial assistance toolkit. 
5. Struggling to balance solidarity and responsibility
T he Franco-German economists have become disappointed by the lack of pro-gress on reform path (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2019). The authors argued that 
risk-sharing and market discipline are not antagonistic but rather complemen-
tary, compromising thus between those who advocated a specifi c stabilization 
budget for the euro area (France and Spain) and those who rejected the priority 
of a common euro area budget (Pisani-Ferry and Zettelmeyer 2019). However, 
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the economists’ proposals imply more market discipline than risk-sharing. That 
said, more ambiguous progress in the banking union’s completion is out of play. 
Furthermore, these proposals include a “conditional solidarity”. More analyti-
cally, three basic mechanisms are proposed for a “conditional” and limited debt 
mutualization:
The fi rst mechanism concerns the bank debt and involves the creation of a 
deposit insurance scheme, which however remains fragmented. In particular, 
it is proposed that “losses should fi rst be borne by the relevant ‘national com-
partment’ of the scheme, while common funds (either a separate mutualized 
compartment, or all other compartments jointly) can be tapped only in large, 
systemic crises which overburden one or several national compartment(s)”. In 
this way, “separate collective deposit insurance schemes (e.g. associated with 
national or cross border institutional protection schemes) could be treated as 
separate compartments, on a case-by case basis under general criteria to be set 
in order to deter abuses” (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2018: 8).
The second one concerns the allocation of fi nancial risks to minimize the 
insolvency risk, which is more pronounced for the Eurozone member states in 
comparison with similar countries which have a national currency. According 
to the economists’ view that fi nally was adopted by policymakers, the funda-
mental principle for a member state to be granted with ESM’s assistance is to 
comply with the fi scal rules on budgetary limits and public debt sustainability. 
Moreover, the requesting country should have access to international capital 
markets on reasonable terms and a sustainable external position. As a result, 
market discipline, introduced through these requirements, imposes stricter con-
straints to risk-sharing and does not mitigate the sovereign-bank risk nexus. 
And here comes the following paradox: Such a mechanism is created for ensur-
ing fi scal and fi nancial stability, but it ultimately makes fi nancial markets key 
in decision-making for states’ access or not to fi nancial assistance. In theory, 
these proposals focus on minimizing the risk of idiosyncratic demand shocks and 
the risk of a national banking crisis. Nevertheless, they neglect the insolvency 
risk of euro area membership, which is, as mentioned earlier, absent for similar 
countries with monetary autonomy (Bofi nger 2018).
The third mechanism, in line with the above proposals, is the creation of 
a “euro safe asset”. Safety is achieved by some combination of diversifi cation 
and seniority, which means that fi nancial intermediaries buy a standardized 
diversifi ed government bond portfolio and use it as collateral for the newly is-
sued securities in several tranches. Introducing such assets in parallel with a 
regulation on limiting sovereign concentration risk is expected by the authors 
to further contribute to fi nancial stability. However, given that the government 
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bonds of the debtor countries have lower credit ratings, it is diffi cult to fi nd buy-
ers for subordinated debt in times of crisis, as the Franco-German economists 
themselves admit. This proposal therefore limits risk-sharing, since “bonds of 
countries that lose market access should no longer be eligible for purchase by 
safe asset issuers” (Benassy-Quéré et al. 2018: 18). A weak point of this proposal 
is that the unequal position of the member states is not considered. Due to the 
existing high debt ratios of some countries, the disciplining role of fi nancial mar-
kets over states will perpetuate pockets of weakness between debtor and creditor 
countries. For this reason, the real problem that remains untouched from the 
Franco-German economists is how to compromise market discipline with fi nan-
cial stability, without causing a crisis at the time of introducing the proposed 
regime (“transition problem”). 
Another defi ciency of their proposals is the lack of measures to limit the risk 
of non-performing exposures of banks. Low interest rates, combined with high 
stocks of non-performing loans (NPLs), negatively affect bank profi tability. Only 
if we fi nd a solution to reduce the outstanding stock of NPLs, we pave the way for 
a real single deposit insurance system, which “will contribute decisively to break-
ing the vicious circle of bank and state debt”, as the governor of the central bank 
of Spain commented in the same vein (Reuters 2018). But the main obstacle to 
this process is again the fear of moral hazard. Some member states are worried 
about the potential losses stemming from the “bad” debt of other member states. 
Germany, the largest economy in the EU, has rejected plans of risk-sharing on 
the banking market, fearing that German taxpayers will end up paying the bill 
for banks of the debtor countries. These objections may be dispersed if the nomi-
nated entity to absorb “bad” loans raises money issuing bonds or equity. That is 
the case of a European “bad” bank. In more detail, the proposal of the head of 
the European Banking Authority, Andrea Enria, includes the establishment of 
a European Asset Management Company, fi nanced mainly by private resources. 
This entity will buy non-performing loans at the market value or at signifi cant 
discount, selling them within the next three years (Enria 2017). Should sales 
not be realized, the states and the shareholders will cover the losses. If a spe-
cifi c trade operation fails, the state is required to recapitalize the bank; also the 
shareholders of that bank will bear the cost of the failed trading operation. In 
this way, the fear of moral hazard seems to be reduced (Enria 2017). On his part, 
Klaus Regling, the director of the ESM, supported the proposals of the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) to create a pan-European “bad” bank. Regling pointed 
out that such a plan “may need a role for the public sector”, and that “the new 
(public) entity will aim to acquire up to €250 billion, of about €1 trillion of bad 
loans in EU lenders’ balance sheets” (Reuters 2017). 
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A fi nal concern that emerges from the Franco-German economists’ proposals 
is whether the market discipline ensures fi nancial stability. The global fi nancial 
crisis of 2007/8 has shown that credit fl ows are particularly procyclical and vola-
tile. Accordingly, for some countries, the global fi nancial cycle can lead to exces-
sive credit growth in boom times and excessive retrenchment in bad times. In 
short, the global fi nancial cycle seems to be associated with “surges and retrench-
ments in capital fl ows, booms and busts in asset prices and crises” (Rey 2018: 2).
6. Conclusion
D uring the euro area sovereign debt crisis, sovereigns were exposed to bank risk, and banks were exposed to sovereign risk. This two-way risk exposure 
generated a “vicious circle”. In this regard, the role of a fully complete banking 
union in the euro area is two-fold: (a) to mitigate the credit risk arising from trou-
bled banks to the balance sheet of their sovereigns and (b) to mitigate the credit 
risk generating from sovereigns to the banking system holding public debt. Yet 
the establishment of the European banking union is not complete. On the one 
hand, all systemically important banks have been subject to a joint supervision at 
supranational level under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Moreover, 
introducing the common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), to be 
provided by the ESM, further enhanced the credibility of the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) as the resolution authority in the banking union. On the other hand, 
breaking the doom loop between banks and sovereigns requires more risk-shar-
ing and initiatives to help banks diversify their investment in sovereign bonds. 
To this end, the adoption of a common safe asset to manage the fl ow of credit 
risk emanating from sovereigns to the banking system is needed. Accordingly, a 
European Insurance Deposit Scheme (EIDS) is still lacking, along with further 
measures to tackle the remaining risks of the banking sector; in particular, those 
related to non-performing loans (e.g. a European-level “bad” bank).
On these crucial issues, a battle of interests between core and periphery 
economies is unfolding. The European “South” advocates more solidarity and 
deeper banking integration. In the opposite direction, limited risk-sharing and 
fi scal responsibility seems to be the priorities of the core economies. Accordingly, 
in an attempt to reconcile solidarity and responsibility, certain political initia-
tives and proposals on the future of the Eurozone consider risk-sharing and mar-
ket discipline as complementary elements, which should be conditio sine qua 
no for the new Eurozone architecture. Building bridges between the two poles 
is extremely important, from a political, economic and fi nancial perspective. 
However, the “window of opportunity” for signifi cant political initiatives, as 
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it was the case in 2012, no longer exists. In fact, the lack of substantial risk-
sharing arrangements creates higher risk of fi nancial instability. The negative 
legacy of crisis in the banking sector reduces the attractiveness of common safety 
networks. Market discipline seems to be the concept for the organization of the 
Eurozone, as Eurozone’s policy makers assign a disciplining role to fi nancial 
markets over states. This development marks a signifi cant shift in the relation 
between governments and fi nancial markets, in the after 2007/8 era; and as 
Habermas says “the imbalance between the imperatives of the market and the 
regulatory power of politics has been identifi ed as the real challenge under these 
conditions” (Habermas 2012: 337).
Notes
1. “The policy window is an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push 
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon 
2015: 165).
2. The number of signifi cant institutions that was directly supervised by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) from 1 January 2019 stands at 119 following 
the annual review of signifi cance and ad hoc assessments (ECB 2018).
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